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ABSTRACT

Harnessing wind offshore is an increasingly prevalent form of renewable energy
production. For these large offshore wind farms to be successful, there must be a
reasonable level of social acceptance for the developments. There is a great deal of
research around how to measure social acceptance of renewable energy developments,
but as of yet there has not been a large, utility-scale offshore wind farm in the United
States to examine. This study uses a well cited framework created in 2012 by
researchers Sovacool and Ratan to measure levels of social acceptance in
Massachusetts of the proposed Vineyard Wind development, which is an 800
megawatt offshore wind farm that has agreed to sell power to the State of
Massachusetts.
Findings from this study show that while the framework proves a useful tool for
measuring levels of social acceptance, some categories lack applicability to large-scale
offshore wind in the U.S. This is particularly apparent with regard to the role of
national versus state policy and support, the dearth of community or individual
ownership and/or control, and the insufficient analysis of opposition opinion. While
key informants of Massachusetts have a net positive view of the proposed Vineyard
Wind project, this support is nuanced and multi-layered. This study highlights the fact
that separating individuals into one of two categories - supportive or resistant - does
not accurately represent the truth and woefully oversimplifies a complex topic.

This study utilized a qualitative method of data collection through a series of
semi-structured interviews conducted through the Spring and Summer of 2018. These
interviews provided data which could then be coded and sorted into the categories
defined by Sovacool and Ratan. This analysis helped identify indicators and evidence
of support that were used to assess each section of the framework and determine if and
how well a specific criterion was met.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Climate change is in the global spotlight now more than ever. One hundred and
eighty-five nations have ratified the Paris Climate Agreement (“Paris Agreement |
Summary & Facts” Britannica, 2019), and although the United States has signaled its
intent to pull out, twenty-five States and Territories have come together as part of the
United States Climate Alliance pledging to meet (and in some cases to surpass) the
Convention’s goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (U.S. Climate Alliance).
The National Climate Assessment cites the burning of fossil fuels as one of two
primary causes of modern day climate change, the other cause being the clearing of
forests (National Climate Assessment, 2014).
The adoption of renewable energy technologies is a central element in
international and national mitigation strategies and plans for lowering emissions
(UNFCC, 2017). In the United States, wind energy production is a rapidly growing
industry and is expected to surpass hydroelectricity to become the largest renewable
energy source in the country (Energy Information Administration, 2018).
Offshore wind farms have been being developed outside the U.S. since 1991, and
in the decades since, the industry has ballooned, with Europe leading the charge
(Arapogianni et al., 2011). One of the main reasons for this increase in the prevalence
and popularity of the technology is that siting these projects out at sea allows for much
larger turbines which can harness far more energy than their terrestrial counterparts.
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This allows the developments to produce vast amounts of clean energy and gives
governments a powerful tool in their efforts to lower GG emissions (National Offshore
Wind Strategy, 2016).
Despite the fact that the east coast of the United States - in particular the northeast
region - has been determined to be a highly productive area for harnessing wind power
(National Offshore Wind Strategy, 2016), the United States had abstained from
building any offshore wind developments until 2016, when a small scale five-turbine
wind farm was built in Rhode Island state waters.
Since then, the industry has begun to gain traction. The Federal Government had
already begun to designate lease areas (see Figure 1.1), but there was an uptick in state
activity up and down the East Coast, and winning bidders have since begun entering
into power purchase agreements with states (Lease and Grant Information | Bureau of

Figure 1.1: Federally designated lease areas for offshore wind development on the eastern USA.
Source: Business Network for Offshore Wind
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Ocean Energy Management), and companies are opening regional offices to integrate
themselves into this burgeoning United States market (Mass CEC).
There is clear enthusiasm among legislators in the northeastern region of the
United States; New York State alone is supporting the development of 9,000
megawatts of offshore wind energy by 2035 (NYSERDA), while Massachusetts has
declared itself to be at the forefront of offshore wind development and is currently
moving forward with plans to develop the first large scale offshore wind farm in
United States Federal Waters (WBUR, 2018).
Given the fact that the United States has held out for so long and is now poised to
enter the global market as a major player, there is a lot of pressure for the country’s
first utility scale development to be successful. Failure has the potential to set the
United States back in a big way, especially given the country’s lukewarm history of
support of renewables (Sovacool and Ratan, 2012). It is well documented and widely
understood by now by social scientists, researchers, and analysts of wind energy in
particular that social acceptance is crucial for true success of renewable energy
developments into existing energy markets (Bidwell, 2017, Szarka, 2006,
Wüstenhagen et al., 2007).
This study uses a widely cited framework for assessing social acceptance of
renewable energy technologies to examine the upcoming offshore wind energy project
in Massachusetts known as Vineyard Wind. The goals of this study were: 1) To assess
levels of acceptance in MA per the framework both with respect to the Vineyard Wind
project and offshore wind energy in general, 2) To determine if this framework can be
!3

effectively used with respect to the Vineyard Wind development, and 3) To provide
early insights into whether or not this framework can be effectively used with respect
to utility-scale offshore wind developments in general.
Findings from this study show that the framework overall is a well-designed and
useful tool for measuring social acceptance of the Vineyard Wind development among
key participants. That said, there are aspects of the framework that didn’t translate
particularly well, including: 1) the duality of national and state governments in the
United States and their inconsistent policies and levels of support for renewables, and
2) a lack applicability to utility-scale offshore wind farms as compared to more
community based terrestrial projects. Furthermore, there were aspects of the
framework which were identified as being problematic as they are currently written,
including an overall failure to acknowledge a sliding scale of support.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND

2.1 CONTEXT
In 2007, Dr. Rolf Wüstenhagen and colleagues published “Social acceptance of
renewable energy innovation: An introduction to the concept” (Wustenhagen et al.,
2007). As it was explained by the authors, this article was written during a time when
many countries were ramping up energy production using renewable resources. This
article states that there was an urgent need at the time for public opinion and social
acceptance of renewable energy development to be taken much more heavily into
account than what was the trend among countries at that time. Wüstenhagen et al. paid
special attention to public opinion surrounding terrestrial wind energy developments,
explaining that at the time the visual impact of turbines was a hotly debated subject in
many countries. The article laid out three categories of social acceptance for new
renewable energy infrastructure: socio-political, market, and community.

Socio-political:
The strength or lack thereof of a State or Nation’s institutional capacity may serve
either as a major catalyst or a powerful impediment to the undertaking. For any largescale project to be built in the first place, there must of course be at least a minimal
level of political support, even it is simply in the form of mere tolerance. Beyond this,
political scientists and researchers offer the perspective that policy makers are some of
the most relevant actors, and that their political behaviors and decisions can have the
!5

greatest impacts (Dermont et al., 2017, Wolsink, 2000). True socio-political support
must come from proactive and comprehensive policies, ideally developed using a
well-reasoned and carefully executed process (Dermont et el., 2017).

Market:
Governments must have economic policies which allow for programs or
incentives that facilitate smooth integration of renewable technologies into the existing
market system (Green and Vasilakos, 2011, Wüstenhagen et al., 2007). In order to
create true market acceptance, these policies should ideally be informed by fiscal
projections based on comparable ex-post analyses (Brown et al., 2012, Xia and Song,
2017, De Silva et al., 2016) which help to inform overall economic impacts (Slattery et
al., 2011). Economic analyses are vitally important tools which can help coordinate
governmental interests with public interests and budgetary constraints (Green and
Vasilakos, 2011). There should also be a robust domestic supply chain, both in order to
grow national workforce, but also to reduce reliance on imported goods (Slattery et al.,
2011).

Community:
While socio-political acceptance considers the viewpoints of politicians and
existing legislature, and market acceptance looks into economic integration and
healthy competition of renewable technologies, community acceptance focuses
primarily on the micro rather than the macro level and prioritizes the opinions of
regular denizens and taxpayers. It has been well established that community
!6

acceptance is vitally important in overall social acceptance of renewable energy
technology developments (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007, Aitken, 2010, Bidwell 2013).
Communities play host to the actual infrastructure, and without the support of
inhabitants and users of the space, there is a decreased chance that locals will be
willing to host the proposed development (Devine-Wright et al., 2017). The idea that
most objection comes in the form of the “Not In My Backyard” (or NIMBY as it’s
more commonly referred to as) is one that is being phased out by social scientists
(Wolsink, 2000). While it is tempting to assume that any opponent of a wind energy
development in their community possesses this NIMBY mindset, it’s been proven that
opposition often comes from a wider array of dissenters, and that the “social gap”
between general acceptance of wind energy and actual development of projects can
often be attributed to groups or individuals trying to protect specific sites from
development (Bell et al., 2005, 2013, Bidwell 2016). Specific site opposition may be
based on concerns including but not limited to over the natural environment, the
historical significance of the site, concerns over accessibility to the area.

2.2 FRAMEWORK FOR MEASURING SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE
The 2007 article written by Wüstenhagen et al. was integral in the formalization
of “social acceptance” as an area of study with respect to renewable energy, and the
three-tiered backbone of socio-political, market, and community acceptance became a
tool commonly used by subsequent researchers (Gaede & Rowlands, 2019). Five years
after Wüstenhagen et al. published their seminal article, researchers Sovacool and
!7

Table 2.1: Framework for Measuring Social Acceptance of Wind and Solar Electricity Developments.
Source: Sovacool and Ratan, 2012

Ratan published a paper titled “Conceptualizing the acceptance of wind and solar
electricity” (Sovacool and Ratan, 2012), which expanded upon Wüstenhagen et al.’s
framework. This article proposed three conditions within each of the three categories
for a total of nine criteria (see Table 2.1). The goal of the researchers was to provide a
checklist of sorts that could be used to assess levels of social acceptance of a
renewable energy development; in other words, meeting more criteria would indicate a
higher level of acceptability of the development. The researchers state that their belief
that all or most of their nine criteria must be met in order to ensure a seamless web of
socio-political, market, and community acceptance.
Under the socio-political category, the three criteria are: 1) Strong institutional
support, 2) Political commitment, and 3) Favorable legal and regulatory frameworks.
These criteria aim to assess how receptive the governmental structure is to renewable
energy in the location where the development is located. Designated branches of
government along with supportive legislators and favorable laws or regulations are
some of the indicators of socio-political acceptance.
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The three criteria under the market category are: 4) Competitive installation /
production costs, 5) Mechanisms for information and feedback, and 6) Access to
financing. These criteria aim to assess how well the development will integrate into the
economy in the location where the development is located. Governmental incentives
and financing schemes are examples of indicators of market acceptance.
Lastly the three criteria under the community category are: 7) Prolific community
or individual ownership and use, 8) Participatory project siting, and 9) Recognition of
externalities or positive public image. These criteria aim to assess how relevant
stakeholders in the location where the development is located feel about it. Local
ownership, an influential voice in the planning process, and predisposition to
renewable energy are some of the examples of indicators of acceptance at the
community level.
Sovacool and Ratan tested this framework on four case studies: residential solar
photovoltaic (PV) in Germany, residential solar PV in the United States, terrestrial
commercial wind energy in Denmark, and terrestrial commercial wind energy in India.
This article has gained a reputation of being authoritative with respect to social
acceptance of renewable energy development in the field of social sciences (DevineWright et al., 2017).

2.3 CONTEXTUALIZING OFFSHORE WIND IN THE UNITED STATES
Offshore wind farms have been developed since 1991, with the first utility scale
project installed in 2001 in Danish waters (EWEA, 2011). Since 2011, Europe has
!9

been the
frontrunner in
offshore wind
energy production;
as of 2018, Europe
had 4,543 grid
connected offshore
turbines for a total
of 18,499

Figure 2.1: Capacity in Megawatts per country.
Source: Global Wind Energy Council, 2017

megawatts (WindEurope, 2019). Aside from Europe, China has also become a major
player in the offshore wind market. Figure 2.1 shows, by country, the capacity in
megawatts per country as of 2017.
With all the successes the offshore wind industry has had over the past two
decades, there has been a stark lack of development in the United States. The only
offshore turbines in the US are the five of the Block Island Wind Farm, a 30-megawatt
development located off the coast of Block Island, RI, completed in 2016. This smallscale pilot project came to fruition for a multitude of reasons including strong
gubernatorial support (BusinessWire, 2008), a collaborative planning process with the
Block Island community (Klain et al., 2017), and the promise of benefits including an
end to diesel powered electrical generation on Block Island (EcoRINews, 2017). Most
notably however, the project stayed entirely within RI State waters. As of today, there
are still no large-scale offshore wind developments in United States waters. In a 2009
!10

Table 2.2: Barriers to development of energy efficiency and renewables in the United States. Source:
Sovacool, 2009)

article, Sovacool examined major impediments to energy efficiency and renewable
energy in the United States. Table 2.2 details his findings.

2.3.1 CAPE WIND
This is not to say there have not been efforts to deploy offshore wind energy in the
U.S, the most notable of which was Cape Wind (Firestone et al., 2018). Beginning in
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2001 and continuing for over a decade, Cape Wind Associates LLC (CWA) fought to
create America’s first offshore wind farm. The proposal was for a 468-megawatt
development consisting of 130 turbines (Cape Wind | BOEM). The main source of
controversy, however, was that it would have been located in the historic Nantucket
Sound. By the end of 2017, CWA finally announced that it would relinquish its lease
after years of battles (Cape Wind | BOEM). The process had been so contentious that a
documentary was made in 2011 titled “Cape Spin” in an effort to capture the struggle
between developers, conservationists, and wealthy families like the Kochs and the
Kennedys, both of whom were in vehement opposition to the project (Seelye, 2017).
Interestingly enough, with Cape Wind officially pronounced dead and with the
success of the Block Island Wind Farm, a new wave of interest and investment has
arrived in the United States with respect to offshore wind farms (Bush and Hoagland,
2016, Klain et al., 2017). The Federal agency overseeing offshore wind energy
development, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, has fifteen active commercial
leases along the outer continental shelf designated as areas specifically for offshore
wind energy development which could cumulatively generate over 21 gigawatts of
electricity (“A Message From BOEM’s Acting Director”, 2019).

2.4 MASSACHUSETTS AND VINEYARD WIND
Massachusetts has declared itself to be at the forefront of offshore wind
development in the United States and is currently racing to develop the first utility
scale offshore wind farm in US Federal Waters (WBUR, 2018). In the summer of 2016
!12

the Massachusetts legislature ratified a piece of legislation titled An Act to Promote
Energy Diversity (Massachusetts Bill 4568) which mandated that State utilities
contract 1600 megawatts of renewable electricity by the year 2027. The following
summer, Massachusetts issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) for offshore wind energy
contracts, and in May of 2018, Vineyard Wind won the procurement bid
(Massachusetts Ocean Management Plan).
The Vineyard Wind project is an 800-megawatt wind farm which will be located
within a 160,000-acre parcel south of Martha’s Vineyard. The project is still in the
development and permitting stage, but it promises to provide power to more than
400,000 Massachusetts homes at competitive prices and cut carbon emissions by more
than 1.6 million tons per year (Vineyard Wind. “Vineyard Wind 1”).
The framework introduced by Sovacool and Ratan in 2012 will function as the
guide for this study; however, this particular analysis will use the nine criteria solely to
examine offshore wind energy. Specifically, this study aims to determine if this
framework can be used effectively when considering the Vineyard Wind project, in
hopes of informing further research into whether the framework can be applied as-is to
offshore wind energy development in general, as opposed to simply terrestrial
renewable energy infrastructure.
While the mechanics of offshore wind turbines are similar in many ways to those
of their onshore counterparts, there are marked differences. The turbines are far larger
and the process of installation (both from an engineering and policy perspective) is
decidedly different. Unsurprisingly, the idea that creating a massive industrial complex
!13

miles from shore protects it from controversy is in no way true; environmental
considerations and spatial planning issues persist, as does the need for thorough public
participation (Haggett, 2008). Siting a project in a marine environment can be an
emotionally charged and controversial affair (Bidwell, 2017). The prospect of such
construction can evoke powerful opposition based on a perceived invasion or
disturbance of an individual or a community’s sense of place. This further reinforces
the need for public input and community engagement every step of the way.
Alternatively, it has been argued that community acceptance is too heavily
emphasized (Wolsink, 2000), and that while undeniably important, public attitude is
only one piece of a larger puzzle of social acceptance. This is where the other two
categories of socio-political and market acceptance come in; understanding all three of
these aspects and recognizing them each as valid helps to bring together a wide array
of experts from across the spectrum of those involved. This in turn allows an array of
stakeholders to feel heard, and more importantly respected (Aitken, 2010), thus easing
the tensions of a delicate situation.
This study tests Sovacool and Ratan's nine criteria against offshore wind energy
for the first time in the United States and aims to understand the social climate of
Massachusetts with respect to the development of offshore wind energy. Offshore wind
farms were not among the case studies addressed by Sovacool and Ratan and were
hardly discussed or considered in the analysis. Their under-representation in this piece
is especially noticeable considering the fact that the technology was well established in
Europe by 2012. This study considers how key participants and stakeholders in
!14

Massachusetts feel about the Vineyard Wind project by using Sovacool and Ratan’s
2012 framework to identify indications of support of opposition. The findings from
this study may prove beneficial in further research in the field. While there no largescale offshore wind farms in the United States as of yet, there are (as previously stated)
many plans for development. As wind farms are built in federal waters of the United
States, the considerations and determinations in this study along with the conclusions
drawn could serve as a resource for future research.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODS

This study followed a pragmatic research method - an approach that encourages
using “whatever philosophical or methodological approach works best for the
particular research problem at issue” (Robson, p. 183). In the original 2012 study by
Sovacool and Ratan, the researchers populated their framework with data collected
through interviews. Participants of that study represented key stakeholders, including
(but not limited to) electric utility companies, academic institutions, nongovernmental
organizations, research institutes, regulatory agencies, government systems, and
manufacturing companies. For the study reported here, the goal was to take as similar
an approach as possible in an effort to use the framework as it was intended, which in
turn allowed this researcher to best determine how effectively it would translate with
respect to the Vineyard Wind project.
Data were collected through a series of semi-structured key participant interviews.
Rather than conduct random sampling, the individuals were selected specifically for
their connections to the criteria with which this project is concerned, namely sociopolitical, market and community. Potential interviewees were selected based on their
involvement - be it professional, recreational and/or social - that illustrated that they
were particularly connected with and informed on the establishment of with the
offshore wind energy in Massachusetts.
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3.1: METHODOLOGY:
The original list of participants to be contacted for interviews was created using a
purposive sampling approach (Robson, 2016). This list included legislators, agency
representatives, and stakeholder representatives such as developers, regional
commissions and planning councils, as well as environmental groups and fishing
advocates. The list expanded through snowball sampling (Robson, 2016) after
recommendations from interviewees, and through in-person networking at conferences
and meetings. Such events include but are not limited to the International Offshore
Wind Partnering Forum Conference which took place in Princeton, New Jersey
between April 3 and April 9 of 2018; the Marine Renewable Energy Conference in Fall
River, Massachusetts on May 16, 2018; and the Northeast Regional Planning Body
Spring Meeting in Warwick, Rhode Island on June 21, 2018.
Individuals were contacted either through email or telephone call (see Appendix
A for full scripts). If an individual was met at a networking event, they received the
same email or phone call as those found in Appendix A, altered only to include where
they were met. If they were referred by another participant, the identity of that
participant was kept private, and they were referred to only tangentially by their type
of work, for example “a member of the Massachusetts legislature suggested that you
would be a good person to speak with.”
Dates and times for the interviews were scheduled either through email or on the
phone. If the interview was to be in-person, the researcher would bring two copies of a
blank consent form (see Appendix C); one for the participants to sign and return to the
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researcher and one for them to keep. If the interviews were to be conducted over the
phone, participants were emailed the consent form ahead of time and asked to sign,
scan, and email it back ahead of the interview. No interviews were conducted without
a signed consent form.
The semi-structured interviews all followed the same script known as an
interview protocol (see Appendix B), which was designed to facilitate discussion
without restricting conversation. Semi-structured interviews allow for discussion to
evolve naturally and offer a greater deal of flexibility to both the participants and
researchers with respect to the order of and the amount of time spent on each question
(Robson, 2016). By using this method, each question was answered uniquely, allowing
for perspectives and insights to vary from person to person.
The interviews were divided into the three main categories set out in Sovacool
and Ratan’s framework: Socio-Political, Market, and Community. Within each of the
categories, questions were designed to generate data which could be used to inform the
nine criteria. Before discussing the scripted questions, each participant was given an
opportunity to discuss their backgrounds and their connection to offshore wind energy.
This was both to allow the participants to get comfortable, as well as a way to glean
any extra pieces of data that may not have come out naturally doing the rest of the
questioning.
Interviews were transcribed using NVivo 11; a research software designed to help
code and organize qualitative data. Data was then coded into categories; nine were
based directly on the framework, and several others were created as important tools for
!18

organizing and defining indicators to populate the framework’s criteria (see Appendix
D for full codebook). This study was written based off of the analysis of this coded
data.
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CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS / DISCUSSION

This section will detail how interview participants responded to the questions
asked of them which were designed specifically to correspond with the nine criteria
presented by Sovacool and Ratan. Not only do these responses comprise the data
which informs the efficacy of the framework, but they also provide a well-rounded
assessment of public perceptions and overall sentiment.
Subsection 4.1: Criteria will consider each of the nine criteria separately. Each
analysis will begin with an italicized review of Sovacool and Ratan’s definition of the
criterion. Each of the nine criteria will be analyzed using lines of questioning
including (but not limited to): Was the criterion satisfied? If so, how well was it met?
Did participants feel that enough was being done? How did participants feel about the
process through which the project is being developed?
The next subsection 4.2: General Discussion will consider three themes which
emerged apart from the framework but still informed how people feel in Massachusetts
with respect to Vineyard Wind and offshore wind in general. Subsection 4.2.1:
Distinctions looks into differences between how people feel about offshore wind and
renewable energy in general versus how people feel about the Vineyard Wind project
specifically. Subsection 4.2.2: Commercial Fishing provides an overview of the
controversy between developers and the commercial fishing industry. Finally
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subsection 4.2.3: Transmission Concerns briefly considers concerns over the physical
integration of the energy produced into the existing electrical grid.
The reason for this organizational structure - specifically the rationale behind
combining findings and discussion into one section - is that given the qualitative
nature of this study attempting to boil responses down to statistical-style data would be
a mistake. Interviews were loosely structured and allowed for discussion to flow
naturally. Responses were multi-layered, and findings must be presented in in tandem
with context in the form of discussion or else they will not make sense or accurately
convey nuanced realities.
Throughout this section, participants will be referred to in general terms designed
to describe the sectors they represent. No quotes will be directly attributed to any
interviewees in an effort to preserve their privacy.

4.1: CRITERIA
This section goes through each of the nine criterion, defines them, and discusses
indicators showing how they were or were not met. Discussion around how well they
were met will follow in the conclusions section.

4.1.1 SOCIO-POLITICAL:
Criterion 1:
Strong Institutional Capacity: Countries exhibit institutional support at the
national level through ministries or departments of energy with specific programs
or subsectors dedicated to renewable energy, or have government sponsored
institutes doing research on renewable energy.
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Starting from the top, The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) through its Wind
Energy Technologies Office) and The Department of the Interior (DOI) through the
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) are the main federal entities
concerned with offshore wind energy development (DOE | National Offshore Wind
Strategy) along with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
Ultimately BOEM is the agency which leases offshore wind energy areas. BOEM
restructured in 2010, changing its name from the Mineral Management Service
(MMS) in order to, “more accurately describe the scope of the organization’s
oversight” (“The Reorganization of the Former MMS” | BOEM). The main areas of
focus for BOEM are Oil and Gas Energy, Renewable Energy, Environment, and
Marine Minerals.
The Vineyard Wind project is being developed in a lease area designated by
BOEM, unlike the Block Island Wind Farm, which was located in Rhode Island State
waters. While the very fact that there is a Federal agency responsible for overseeing
and managing offshore wind development might suggest support at a national level,
the sentiment from most participants in the study was that there was not much capacity
at the Federal level. As one participant stated,
“Federally speaking we definitely are struggling . But also hopefully
temporary. And I should say federally at the administration level we aren't
necessarily struggling in Congress but we also just don't have to ask much of
Congress these days. I mean offshore wind is just so multi… so intergovernmental, there's permitting that needs to happen federally, state,
locally. So to have all of those levels of government being supportive at one
time - it's like the stars have never fully aligned…”
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Another participant who echoed this sentiment expanded on the idea that there is a
general lack of coordination at the upper level, not only among legislative branches of
government but also with regard to gathering information and cooperating with other
agencies.
“…the regulatory framework is very complicated, and it's one of the most
challenging aspects for the developers, and part of that too is even on the
federal side. While BOEM, they're sort of charged with being the lead federal
agency, they really don't have tremendous capacity internally to handle a lot
of aspects of that, and so they rely on groups like [The National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA)] and the National
Marine Fisheries Service to provide advice about fisheries aspects, and then
they're relying on Coast Guard for safety issues and so on. So it's this
somewhat fuzzy environmental or compliance and safety and permitting
framework that I think has been one of the more challenging aspects of this
for the developers and so I think one of the things that I've heard regularly
called for is some sort of more cohesive process for getting the permitting
and you know for what needs to be done in order to meet the requirements for
environmental compliance and so on.”
At the State level, the perception is quite different with respect to institutional
support. What follows is a list of State and Quasi-State agencies, all of which have a
hand in supporting the development of offshore wind in MA:
• The MA Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs: The only
state Cabinet-level office in the country that oversees both environmental and
energy agencies (Mass.gov. “Executive Office of Energy and Environmental
Affairs.”)
• The MA Department of Energy Resources (mass.gov “About DOER.”)
including:
- Emerging Technology Division: Works to advance emerging technologies
in clean energy and alternative transportation (mass.gov “Emerging
Technology Division.”)
- Energy Efficiency Division: Develops, implements, and oversees energy
efficiency activities (mass.gov “Energy Efficiency Division.”)
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- Energy Policy Planning & Analysis Division: Works to gather and
analyze energy data to provide a comprehensive overview of energy
prices, competitive markets, energy resiliency and more (mass.gov
“Energy Policy Planning & Analysis Division.”)
- Green Communities Division: Provides grants, technical assistance, and
local support from Regional Coordinators to help municipalities reduce
energy use and costs by implementing clean energy projects in municipal
buildings, facilities, and schools (mass.gov “Green Communities
Division.”)
- Renewable Energy Division: Provides information regarding the different
kinds of renewable energy, funding programs and incentives, installation
assistance, and more, including wind, solar, biomass and more (mass.gov
“Renewable Energy Division.”)
• Massachusetts Office of Coastal Zone Management (CZM): The lead policy,
planning, and technical assistance agency on coastal and ocean issues within the
Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs (EEA) and implements
the state’s coastal program under the federal Coastal Zone Management Act
(mass.gov “Massachusetts Office of Coastal Zone Management.”)
Furthermore, there are many academic institutions in Massachusetts working on
government sponsored research, including but not limited to: The University of
Massachusetts Dartmouth, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, and Tufts University.
Technically speaking this could have been a stopping point for this first of nine
criteria, but there was another line of questioning worth pursuing. The phrasing of the
definition had limited “institutional support” to government, or government sponsored
research institutions, not leaving any room for other entities. In interviews, participants
were asked “Which if any organizations involved in offshore wind energy
development are you familiar with?” (see Appendix B), in an effort to find out if the
entities they named would fit into this definition of “institutions.” Unsurprisingly, most
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participants first named whichever organization they were representing. Next, most
named the two major developers; Vineyard Wind (along with sometimes the parent
companies Copenhagen Infrastructure and Avangrid) and Orsted. What follows is a list
of the most common following responses:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM)
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Various academic / research institutions conducting research
Massachusetts State Legislature
Many of the aforementioned State agencies
National Wildlife Federation
The Audubon Society (both National and MA)
The two large utility companies in Massachusetts; National Grid and Eversource
The fishing industry as a whole

Overall, the general sentiment of this criteria was that there was strong State
support but thin Federal support. There was a great deal of overlap during naturally
flowing conversation, and data was not always able to be specifically placed into one
criterion or another. There is more discussion on this to come in the following sections.

Criterion 2:
Political Commitment: Political leaders make promoting renewable energy a
highly visible topic
There was consensus among interviewees that Massachusetts legislators are
generally supportive of offshore wind energy production in their State. Of the
Massachusetts legislators, two were referenced most often: Governor Baker and
Representative Patricia Haddad.
Baker was often described as being initially cautious, but eventually coming
around as a proponent. As one participant put it,
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“Governor Baker came into office in early 2015 and was skeptical about
offshore wind, which is fair given that the experience we'd been going
through with Cape Wind and the price of Cape Wind was higher, but the
governor has given it a chance, and after going through the bidding process,
first signing legislation in 2016 to create the market for offshore wind which
was sort of the missing piece and then you know the follow through on that
utility procurement and seeing the very attractive price of the Vineyard Wind
proposal that was accepted, that I think has done a lot to create greater
acceptance. I think I would dare call it enthusiasm for offshore wind now.”
This idea of cautious, pragmatic support from Baker was echoed by multiple
participants, and the degrees to which they viewed him as a champion versus a
somewhat measured participant varied. While the quote above describes Baker as
having come around to something resembling enthusiasm, others did not share such a
favorable take. Here, one participant asserts,
“The governor, he’s committed but he’s committed in a different way. His
commitment is to the price. So I understand that and I respect that opinion
but I think that that is short sighted in the grand scheme of what we’re trying
to do here.”
Taking it a step further, when asked if they felt that offshore wind had support
from Massachusetts politicians, another participant responded by saying,
“Not enough by the governor. We're looking not just for support we're
looking for leadership. So that means pushing. And certainly New York
Connecticut are doing a lot more when it comes to offshore wind that they're
looking for.”
While there was a general sense of lukewarm support from Governor Baker,
participants were far from tepid in their descriptions of Representative Haddad’s
support. In 2016, Haddad and Matthew Morrissey were awarded “Man and Woman of
the Year.” Morrissey was then the Vice President of Deepwater Wind, the company
that developed the Block Island Wind Farm. Deepwater Wind has since been acquired
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by the European company Orsted, which is headquartered in Denmark. Haddad and
Morrissey were honored for their:
“…leadership and years’ worth of determination to persuade the
Massachusetts Legislature, Gov. Charlie Baker, a swarm of environmental
groups and regulators, and regional business interests that the state and
region could be the launching point for a new industry that would help fight
global warming and create vast economic opportunities.”
(“Morrissey, Haddad Honored for Work on Behalf of Offshore Wind | New
Bedford Economic Development Council”).
During interviews, some participants of the study even referred to Representative
Haddad by her self-appointed nickname the “Witch of Wind”. For context, this
nickname serves as a replacement for what she used to call herself; the “Queen of
Coal”, which was in reference to the newly decommissioned coal fired power plant in
Somerset, MA which lies within her district.
Time and again during interviews, Haddad was referenced as something of a
champion on offshore wind. Haddad was instrumental in pushing through the 2016 Act
to Promote Energy Diversity, “which among other important legislative elements,
allows for the procurement of up to 1,600 megawatts of offshore wind energy by
2027.” (mass.gov “Offshore Wind.”) This piece of legislation will be discussed in
greater depth in the following section. Since then, Haddad has continued her work
promoting offshore wind, introducing more legislation. Said one participant,
“She has filed legislation which we think is a good idea that allows for the
next bids to come in at more than that six cents a kilowatt hour - six and a
half cents, whatever it is. So we think that's a good idea that they can they
can push that up because the law says you can't go higher than the previous
bids. So that's not sustainable. So financially I'm no expert in this but I know
that it doesn't make sense to keep it at six cents.”
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The piece of legislation referenced in the quote above refers to Amendment #280,
as changed to H3800 Offshore Wind Price Decline, which was adopted, and aims to
promote continued market competition among bidders. Additionally, Haddad has
introduced other pieces of pertinent legislation, including but not limited to: H.2487,
An Act Establishing A Commission To Study The Offshore Wind Investment Tax
Credit, and H.2867, An Act Relative To The Continued Enhancement Of The Offshore
Wind Industry In The Commonwealth. The last two bills are currently under
consideration.
Haddad, alongside Morrissey, credited their success in pushing through the 2016
legislation to the teamwork of other members of their legislative delegation, along
with New Bedford Mayor Jon Mitchell and Economic Development Director Derek
Santos, as well as the Port of New Bedford, various academic institutions, and others
(“Morrissey, Haddad Honored for Work on Behalf of Offshore Wind | New Bedford
Economic Development Council”). With this in mind, it is arguably fair to say that
despite Baker’s middling reviews, Massachusetts has reasonably strong political
commitment.

Criterion 3:
Favorable Legal and Regulatory Frameworks: Laws and regulations facilitate
ease of entry into the renewable energy market, independent renewable energy
producers (even homeowners) are granted access to the electricity grid, national
interconnection standards exist, and regulatory changes occur in a predictable and
transparent manner
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Most participants pointed to the aforementioned 2016 Act to Promote Energy
Diversity when asked about existing legislation surrounding offshore wind energy
development. This legislation, as described below,
“…direct[s] distribution companies (companies engaging in the distribution
of electricity or owning, operating or controlling distribution facilities) to
jointly and competitively solicit proposals for offshore wind energy
generation from offshore wind developers and enter into contracts for the
purchase of up to 1,600 MW of aggregate nameplate capacity by June 30,
2027.” (Burdock and Barminski, 2016)
Generally, people considered this Act to be proof positive of a favorable
framework within the State. Specifically, people cited the fact that the bill directly
requires utilities to contract 1600 megawatts of clean energy, the reasoning being that
making it a mandate signifies genuine legal commitment rather than just simply stating
intent. A few participants also referenced the act passed by the MA State Legislature in
2018 titled An Act to Advance Clean Energy which doubled this requirement to 3200
megawatts by 2030, causing a great deal of excitement in the offshore wind
community (Business Network for Offshore Wind, 2018).
A few participants then brought up a piece of legislation passed in 2018 called
The Energy Future Act, which was the follow-up to the 2016 Act to Promote Energy
Diversity. As one participant put it,
“Certainly the you know the legislation in Massachusetts to help create the
market for offshore wind, which was first signed in 2016 requiring the
utilities to do procurements for offshore wind for entering into long term
power purchase agreements which is - that's what's necessary to enable the
financing is for the investors to see that there's a clear price that the power
can be sold at. And then in 2018 there was a kind of an update the law passed
that increased the amount that we wanted that the state should procure.”
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At the Federal level, multiple participants referenced the Federal tax credit as
legislation which supported offshore wind development, albeit somewhat tangentially.
The full name of this incentive is The Business Energy Investment Tax Credit, or
simply the ITC. This program is a federal income tax credit for capital investments in
renewable energy projects (U.S. DOE). The ITC is the closest piece of federal level
legislation that could act as an indicator with respect to this criterion.
The program has gone through multiple iterations; in 2008 the Energy
Improvement and Extension Act was enacted, which (among other things) extended
existing tax credits for many clean energy technologies by eight years (DSIRE USA).
The credit was further expanded in 2009 by the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act, and again in 2015 by The Consolidated Appropriations Act.
When considering how supportive legal and regulatory frameworks are at the
national level, overall sentiment generally echoed the following quote by one
participant, that;
“…other than the federal tax credit, I’m not sure that they have too
much skin in the game, the feds”
Others described Federal involvement in a slightly more generous light, but still
refrained from going so far as to say there were substantial amounts of support. One
participant referenced another piece of legislation, saying,
“Starting federally there's not a ton of offshore wind legislation, exceptions
being that there's currently an investment tax credit that is due to expire at
the end of 2019 and there is legislation introduced to extend that. There's
also been legislation introduced to establish a grant program for offshore
wind jobs training facilities and just sort of building up offshore wind jobs
training programs. Those are both, well I would say the investment tax credit
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bill very well could be successful. The jobs training one is a little bit less
likely as of now but that could change.”
The ITC will be brought up again and the specific economics will be considered
in further detail in discussion of criterion six in the Market section.

4.1.2 MARKET:
Criterion 4:
Competitive Installation / Production Costs: Renewable energy technologies can
produce electricity at a competitive rate compared to other sources of supply,
driven by government incentives, a large resource endowment, and/or a strong
local manufacturing base
There was general consensus that the offshore wind farm will produce electricity
at a competitive rate, with prices being quoted at 6.5 cents per kilowatt hour. This first
criteria within the Market section describes three elements that can account for healthy
competition; government incentives, a large resource endowment, and/or a strong local
manufacturing base. Each is discussed below:
First, government incentives are apparent in the form of procurement procedures,
power purchase agreements, and legally binding legislation. The directive that
Massachusetts must procure 1600 megawatts of clean energy, and the fact that this
process must be done through competitive bidding in response to the solicitation of a
Request for Proposals (RFP) meant that rates which were ultimately accepted through
power purchase agreements would be affordable to consumers.
A large resource endowment is present given the fact that the area is
geographically very productive for wind. Not only was this idea brought up quite a
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few times by participants, but it has been publicly commented on many times. As
recently as October 1, 2019, New York Environmental Lawyer Dan Chorost was
quoted as saying,
“People refer to the waters off the northeastern United States as the ‘Saudi
Arabia of offshore wind’ because we have the perfect combination of strong
winds, shallow ocean and demand” (Super Lawyers, 2019)
References of the Northeastern US being the “Saudi Arabia of wind” have been
peppered throughout headlines for years. This theme of resource reliability was
summed up by one participant who stated,
“…the energy itself is there… it's like hydro - the resource is there. So there's
zero marginal cost for the energy.”
With respect to the third element however - a strong local manufacturing base there was much discussion regarding how the US is currently lacking a domestic
supply chain. One participant effectively summed up the essence of the matter when
they said,
“We might be undercut - if that's the right word, it's probably not the right
word, by our European companies who are further along in their
development. And so again I think it's a matter of a concerted effort to try to
put these supply chains into place. And it's difficult because we really don't
have a very big footprint right now of offshore wind. I mean it's you know
we're talking I think five turbines right on the Block Island. I think
functioning, that's not exactly a high-volume operation. Now Vineyard
[Wind], now we're talking about more like somewhere in the eighties number
of turbines. So that's going to scale it up. And so I think with that hopefully
we'll also see as a scaling up of those supply chain pathways and the
companies that have that ability to come step into that role. And we'd like to
see that they establish a footprint in this area, we’d prefer that they have a
presence here, and that feeds into sort of the local economy. But I think it's
something we have to kind of wait and see.”
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In conclusion, it appears that there was a general consensus among participants
that there are competitive installation / production costs; although, there is still work to
be done to ensure that Massachusetts doesn’t have to rely too heavily on foreign
imports. That said, there is comfort in knowing that the technology that will be
imported is efficient and advanced.

Criterion 5:
Mechanisms for Information and Feedback: Investors and users/producers have
access to reliable information about renewable energy policies, prices, and
opportunities
To collect data for this section, participants were asked if they felt that there was
an adequate framework in place to inform the public on policy mechanisms. This
proved to be a problematic criterion and will be discussed in greater detail in the
Conclusions section.
One main complicating factor was that the energy generated by the development
will enter the grid and become part of the larger pool of electricity. As one participant
put it, “…we have this interconnection grid and once electricity enters it's fungible.”
As such, there aren’t unique or new policies, prices, or opportunities as a result of
offshore wind development in Massachusetts - the energy produced will simply be
integrated into the grid. As far as having access to reliable information about prices,
the negotiated rate of 6.5 cents per kilowatt hour was made public during the Summer
of 2018.
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Figure 4.1: Screen-grab showing a selection of renewable energy and energy efficiency programs and
incentives for Massachusetts residents. Source: Mass.gov. “Renewable Energy.”

That said, there are currently dozens of polices, services and programs that exist in
Massachusetts with regard to renewable energy and energy efficiency. Figure 4.1 is a
screen-grab from the Massachusetts government website which shows a selection of
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such initiatives. The information is readily available and easily accessible to anyone
who wishes to access it or opt in.
Another way to consider the phrase “access to reliable information” is by
reflecting on the idea of transparency. This criterion indicates that the details of a
project should be publicly available rather than hidden or inaccessible. When asked
about transparency of the process thus far, many participants who didn’t feel confident
speaking to this criterion as it was originally worded felt better able to discuss their
thoughts.
There were two main schools of thought with regard to transparency. The gist of
the less popular perspective was that all of the information is and has been public,
which checks the accessibility box so to speak. As one participant put it,
“There was there was I think a lively open debate about it - it was in the
press a lot. So I think that probably passes muster in terms of transparency…
well and then the utility contracting process, it's a mix, you know closed
procurement where - well, at least when the RFPs come out - that’s widely
publicized; there is a website that's accessible to all where all of the
information is posted - redacted versions of the applications that are received
are all posted, there's an independent evaluator as part of the evaluation
process so you've got the utilities you've got the State Energy Office and then
an independent entity, the attorney general's office has been very engaged.
And then the contracts are reviewed in an open process at the DPU
[Department of Public Utilities]. So I don't know, that sounds fairly
transparent to me.”
A more popular sentiment was that all the info is out there, but one would need a
full-time job dedicated to following along and keeping up with every meeting, forum,
hearing, and comment period in order to stay truly informed. One participant described
the process by saying,
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“I think that it could be far more transparent especially project selection, and
I think we're making progress in this space - So Massachusetts was the first
state to set an offshore wind goal and issue an RFP and select winning bids,
and it was a pretty opaque process, we didn't really have an understanding
of, you know, there was criteria listed in the Request for Proposals but it
wasn't clear how the criteria was being considered, and what had more
weight than other things and then in RFPs since then there have been a bit
more detail on like 75 percent will be cost and 25 percent will be these other
qualitative measures.”
Furthermore, one would need to be able to understand all of the highly technical
elements, complex issues, and complicated language in order to have a voice. This will
be discussed in greater detail in the Community section with respect to Participatory
Project Siting.

Criterion 6:
Access to Financing: Producers, manufacturers, and users have access to
domestic sources of low cost financing and/or can benefit from specific government
financing schemes
Creating the Vineyard Wind project appealed to developers because of the Federal
Tax Credit (ITC), the advanced turbine technology and industry experience (in
Europe), and the requirement that utilities do procurements for offshore wind and enter
into long term power purchase agreements.
The ITC has the potential to save developers millions of dollars on large wind
energy facilities, both land-based and offshore and offers a huge return on investment
(U.S. DOE). The credit for large wind turbines is 12% of expenditures if construction
begins by December 31, 2019 (U.S. DOE). Currently due to expire at the end of 2019,
legislation has been introduced to extend it once again. Advanced turbine technology
and industry experience in Europe provides assurance that the industry is stablished
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and removes a degree of risk. That said, it was the requirement that utilities do
procurements for offshore wind and enter into long term power purchase agreements
that was most commonly referenced as being a major driver of success. For example,
on August 2, 2018, WCAI, the Local NPR station for the Cape, Coast & Islands
published an article stating,
“Vineyard Wind has attributed their drastically lower rate to the fact that
offshore wind technology has advanced in the last few years and turbines are
more powerful and efficient now. Experts also say the competitive bid
process enacted by the state, and a 20-year power purchase agreement with
the company, has contributed to a lower rate, as has a federal investment tax
credit which will add about $200 million in savings for the
company.” (Mizes-Tan, 2018)
These long-term contracts are so important to developers because of the fact that
these projects are financed by private investors. While it may be based out of offices
based in Boston and New Bedford, Vineyard Wind LLC is a joint venture between
Avangrid Renewables which is a subsidiary of Iberdrola - a multi-national electric
utility company based out of Spain (Iberdrola) - and Copenhagen Infrastructure
Partners (CIP) - a multinational fund management company based out of Denmark
(Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners).
One specific detail that was cited as being a particularly beneficial was that
Massachusetts, unlike other states, have made utility participation a statutory
requirement, rather than a policy with room for choice in the matter. One participant
succinctly summed this up by saying,
“…a wind farm won't be built unless a developer knows that someone's going
to buy their electricity. And with the energy act we have in Massachusetts
there's a procurement. So the utilities have to buy the sixteen hundred
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megawatts which means there's a guarantee of some finances with some
payback to it.”

4.1.3 COMMUNITY:
Criterion 7:
Prolific Community / Individual Ownership and Use: Renewable energy systems
tend to be installed, owned, and/or or used locally
Simply put, the answer to the question of whether or not this first criterion was
fulfilled is no. Not only will the project not be locally owned or operated, it will be
located many miles offshore in Federal jurisdiction. Furthermore, it is a large, gridscale power producing facility akin to a traditional power plant.
There were two common schools of thought encountered when participants were
asked whether or not they felt that the citizens of Massachusetts would have an
adequate stake in the control and/or management of the wind farm. Some felt that
citizens had no control and were entirely at the mercy of those in positions of
responsibility. Others felt that although perhaps the average person wouldn’t have
direct control, they felt that their elected officials had a say in the matter, and that
therefore they were acting as a sort of ambassador, advocating for their constituency,
giving the citizens some management-by-proxy. These two viewpoints were not
always mutually exclusive. In the following quotation, a participant effectively
expresses both, stating,
“…the community doesn't own and make decisions about the wind farm, but
they don't own and make decisions about most electricity generators. Our
structure is that the vast majority of these electricity generators are owned by
corporations who site, permit, build, operate, and sell electricity into the
grid. And parts of those processes are regulated, so representing the public
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interest is a public sector regulatory process. So there's indirect public
interest and there's indirect public oversight through their elected officials
and the appointed regulators. But it's not the same as saying it's a
community-owned facility where the Board of Selectmen or the Mayor and
their designees have direct say on how something operates or it's operated by
municipal utility. That's because these are being built in Federal waters and
by companies who are going to be competing to get a power purchase
agreement and sell into the grid. It's indirect public oversight. But there is
public - there is an indirect oversight through the regulatory process.”
Another recurring idea that the quote above shows is this feeling that the average
consumer doesn’t particularly want to or care about being involved with where their
power comes from, and that most people wouldn’t give the matter much thought
anyway. This generally came across as a sort of justification or defense, the reason
being that those participants who said things like this were largely supportive of the
Vineyard Wind project. These participants seemed somewhat reluctant to answer with
a definitive no, and so they brought this up as a sort of compromise. That said, even
the staunchest defenders of the project didn’t say yes. Those participants interviewed
who were somewhat more hesitant with their support - specifically those concerned
with the interests of the fishing community - were much more willing to answer this
criterion with a hard no, with one participant simply stating “No, no no. They're
Federal - they’re in Federal waters.”

Criterion 8:
Participatory Project Siting: People and communities are involved in the decision
to site or permit renewable energy facilities near them
This criterion produced the widest range of opinions and responses. Each
participant was familiar to some extent with the history of how the project was a sited.
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Some brought up legislation that had paved the way, referencing the Massachusetts
Ocean Management Plan which was created in 2009 and amended in 2015. It was
produced in response to the Oceans Act of 2008, and was described in a 2008 legal
publication as being,
“the first of its kind in the country… an effort by the legislature to create a
uniform regulatory system to balance current and future commercial and
recreational uses of Massachusetts’s ocean resources with the need to protect
marine habitats and natural resources. The Act calls for a comprehensive
ocean management plan to be developed by the Secretary of the Executive
Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs (EOEEA) by December 31,
2009.” (Nutter, 2008)
The staunchest proponents of the Vineyard Wind project asserted that the whole
process has been very inclusive, while those with a less rosy outlook on the project
contended that any such inclusion had been more or less for show. One interviewee
candidly stated that the process had been,
“…full steam ahead, and if you get in the way you'll get paid off and that's it.
So there's a sense that there's the developers’ commitments to the [fishing]
industry in terms of hiring liaisons and hosting meetings and hearings is
simply checking a box. Yeah. They don't really care…what happens to that
industry… about what happens to the actual ocean environment. They care
about making money offshore.”
The general outlook of the majority of respondents, however, echoed the concerns
raised in Criterion 5 within the Market section; Mechanisms for Information and
Feedback. The feeling was that while technically there was opportunity for
participation throughout the siting process, it was a virtually impossible task to follow
along with all the news and announcements. Many interviewees laughingly
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commented “define adequate” or “define acceptable” before sharing their thoughts,
mostly reiterating the following sentiment,
“I think just anyone who is not a full time, technical... doesn't have a fulltime technical analyst on their team able to really dig in and pay close
attention to every stage of the process doesn't really have a shot at keeping
up with and weighing in in a meaningful way.”
The feeling of frustration expressed above was coupled with the sense that many
people hadn’t heard of the project until the planning phase was already well underway,
and therefore those individuals felt that by the time the project was on their radar, it
was more or less too late.
There was a similarly large spectrum of opinion among participants around the
idea of inclusivity of the process. Participants expressed anything from dogged
defense around the inclusivity of the process, to staunch criticism of how things had
turned out. Some interviewees felt that all groups/individuals/entities had been well
represented during the siting process and were in no way worse off, others felt the
absolute opposite. As one supportive respondent put it,
“…I mean everyone on Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket was included, the
Native Americans who had, you know, they had everything before we did,
they were very much included in the process, fishermen are continuing to be
included in the process, environmentalists, we have a lot of academics who
have been working with us, URI is one of them, Tufts, three of the UMass
campuses, Mass Maritime Academy, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute,
we have a couple of the State University people, Bridgewater and then a
couple of the community colleges, it’s a consortium”
At the other end of the spectrum was this commercial fisheries representative’s
perspective:
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“Oh yeah. Oh definitely. I mean anyone who relies on those areas for their
livelihood in terms of the resources that are there or even just steaming
through them to get to the resources that they're harvesting has the risk of
being significantly impacted you know they could not have a business if
either it’s is not economical for them to get to their fishing grounds or if the
resources are impacted negatively, so I think there's a high risk for anyone
for any industry, not just fishing but any industry that's actually relying on
the resources in the areas where the wind farms are planned to be developed.
They're at the highest risk of being impacted.”
A large amount of discussion in this section revolved around the conflicts
between the fishing community - specifically commercial fishing - and the rest of
the stakeholders. There will be a more in depth look at this conflict in section
three of this chapter; General Discussion, but for now it is worth nothing that the
main subject of controversy with regard to this section was between people who
felt the fishing industry was acting as too much of an impediment, and those who
felt that livelihood was at stake.

Criterion 9:
Recognition of Externalities or Positive Public Image: Community members are
generally aware of the environmental impact of conventional energy and the
benefits of renewables, cultivating a strong public image
There was nearly unanimous agreement among participants that there is an overall
positive public sentiment towards renewable energy and offshore wind in general
among citizens in Massachusetts. As demonstrated in the two quotations below,
“Massachusetts is very very very much of a leader in clean energy
development and clean technology development and innovation and it's
proven to be good for the economy.”
“Yeah I would say by and large there is majority support. I think again for
the reasons I said earlier, the fact that we do need to shift away from fossil
fuel sources, and it has the potential to be an economic benefit to the area.”
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The most common reasons that participants cited for high levels of Massachusetts
support were: economic boon, job creation, industry growth, climate change
mitigation, and a shift away from fossil fuels. This tracks with the results of a 2018
poll which found that 84% of Massachusetts residents want to be able to choose clean,
renewable energy as a source for their home, 83% of Bay Staters want to be able to
choose who provides their electricity, and 74% of Massachusetts residents would be
interested in 100% of their electricity being renewable energy if provided the option.
(Clean Choice Energy, 2018)
In contract to this rosy sentiment, however, something which was brought up by
quite a few participants was the legacy of the failed Cape Wind project. Nowadays
after years of debate, a common sentiment both among supporters and opponents of
the project can be summed up by one participant’s quote,
“Cape Wind was I think doomed from the start. I shouldn’t [say that] - but it
was close to shore, a part of the Cape, a part of Massachusetts that people
thought of not as having industry but having recreation, having you know…
people go and watch sunsets… you know it was the Cape!”
In the wake of all this turmoil, it has been difficult for advocates of wind farms to
communicate with people who are still dealing with the exhaustion and whiplash of
Cape Wind. Some of the main differences that have needed to be emphasized are
location, price, and overall skepticism. As explained by one respondent,
“…the impact of Cape Wind makes the conversations here a little different
because in Massachusetts people have been hearing about offshore wind for
about 15 years now, and the first 10 years of that was about a project that
was going to really expensive and it was going to be really visible from
shore… it was more controversial than offshore wind development is today.
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So there is a need to like erase that first image in people's mind which doesn't
happen in every state - you know in other states where they don't have that
kind of history it's just a matter of like educating whereas in Massachusetts
it's a matter of like correcting.”
The expensiveness in the quote above refers both to the price per kilowatt hour for
energy, as well as the cost to develop the Cape Wind project itself. Both of these price
concerns have been substantially diminished, and are addressed in the following quote
by another study participant who said,
“…it becomes how much is it gonna cost… I spend so much time saying this
is not Cape Wind, you know in Cape Wind prices were in the 20 [cents per
kWh] and escalating, in these proposals, the price has come in at 7 cents,
and more than likely as the industry matures will come down. Gas the last I
heard was about 3 cents wholesale.”
While this talk of Cape Wind did not counterbalance or overshadow the
overall positive sentiment expressed, it was interesting to consider the history of
opposition to offshore wind energy development. In terms of positive public
image of renewable energy in Massachusetts, this opposition was project-specific
rather than directed toward offshore wind as a whole or renewable energy in
general. That said, it did show that Massachusetts is not so blindly supportive of
the technology that it is prepared to green-light any proposal that comes along; in
fact, the track record showed quite the opposite.

4.2: GENERAL DISCUSSION
As previously stated, while one goal of this study was to determine the efficacy of
Sovacool and Ratan’s framework with respect to Vineyard Wind, another objective
was to understand how key informants in Massachusetts felt about the project and
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offshore wind in general. While most of the discussion in the interviews informed the
framework specifically, these next subcategories cover four themes which emerged
apart from the framework but still inform how people feel.

4.2.1 Distinctions
Something that came to light during the process of interviewing was the fact that
even if an individual or group was supportive of offshore wind development, that did
not mean that they were supportive of the Vineyard Wind project in its entirety. On the
same note, criticism of the Vineyard Wind project did not necessarily equate to
opposition of offshore wind development as a whole. Moreover, participants with
qualms about the Vineyard Wind project, or even those who expressed trepidation
towards offshore wind development in general were not anti-clean energy. As
representative for commercial fisheries explained,
“generally as an academic when you're in your highly educated you know
that we need to do something about climate change you know that we have to
transition away from fossil fuels. So we know we need to do that. Offshore
wind happens to be the low hanging fruit right now. So we, myself included,
realize that we need it but we realize that it comes as a tradeoff. That there
are tradeoffs that are going to have to be made.”
This same respondent later went on to express that they felt the process had been
rushed and not thoroughly researched enough, stating that,
“without doing the research we run the risk of not knowing and then being
surprised about the impacts, maybe, and unfortunately it's been across the
board - this happened in the UK as well, they got fast tracked - if they did any
research before they went in the water it was for a year. Yeah scientifically
you can't use a year data especially here in the Northeast. One year basically
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counts as no data because it's highly variable. So we haven't been able to
understand it.”
This distinction between support of offshore wind development in general versus
support of the Vineyard Wind project itself speaks to the two distinct questions this
study aimed to answer. Criticism of the process and of details of the Vineyard Wind
project all fell within the criteria set out by Sovacool and Ratan and helped to
determine if or how well the framework could be applied. This criticism - as was noted
earlier - did not discount the idea of offshore wind development as a whole, thus
helping to inform the second question, that being how the Massachusetts public feels
about offshore wind development in general - not simply with respect to the project at
hand.

4.2.2 Commercial Fishing
Before delving into a larger discussion, it must be noted that when discussing the
fishing industry (at least within the confines of this study) it is the commercial fishing
industry that is being discussed, not recreational. A point which often gets brought up
when discussing effects of turbines on fishing stocks is the idea that the infrastructure
itself acts as an artificial reef, thus attracting fish (ten Brink & Dalton, 2018). This
point, however, is only brought up with regards to a potential benefit to recreational
fishermen. The concerns expressed by the commercial fishing industry stem from the
fact that they are using much more sizable vessels with large gear and nets which are
unable to navigate as effectively among the structures. Therefore, no matter if there is
a reefing effect or not, if they are unable to operate in the way they need to, it becomes
!46

a moot point. Furthermore, there is a persistent fear that their traditional stocks will be
affected, and reefing will not be enough to offset this. Therefore, unlike recreational
fishermen, representatives of the commercial fishing industry made it clear during the
interviews that they felt their livelihoods were at stake.
Having addressed this contrast between recreational and commercial, it is
important to acknowledge that this study does not delve into the scientific research
around potential impacts on the fisheries of the Northeast United States. Rather, this
section attempts to explain two different perspectives that became apparent during the
interviews. The core of these perspectives was that there was criticism of the Vineyard
Wind project from commercial fishermen, but just as glaringly was the criticism of the
commercial fishing community by the others over their perceived stubbornness and
refusal to budge.
It was widely acknowledged that commercial fishermen do not feel that their
voice has been sufficiently heard throughout the process, nor do they feel that there
has been enough preparatory research done. As one representative from the
community explained,
“There is almost no one in the fishing industry unless they are paid very well
by the offshore developers that says they support offshore wind. There are a
few that will tell you they support it and there's a reason that they're saying
that because a lot of money in their pocket from the people who are doing it.
And that's understandable - they're going into the grounds where they fish,
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they have the potential to impact the resources that they harvest, and the
process that they've gone
through in terms of being
permitted and understanding
impacts and using best
available science has been
completely against what that
community is used to in
terms of the fishery science
process. So there's a very
robust kind of stakeholder
engagement system fishermen didn't realize how
good it was until offshore
wind came along - that they
go through in terms of doing
stock assessments and setting
quotas and developing
allocations for fisheries
Figure 4.2: BOEM’s original Wind Energy Area (WEA).
resources. And that has not
Source: Sigelman, c/o BOEM, 2012
been the case for offshore
wind.”
Other groups, however, felt that the concerns of the fishermen were fully taken
into account, and they would point to the fact that the original proposed area was
massively reduced in size due to concerns and input from the fishing industry as proof.
This is demonstrated in the following quote, which has been abridged slightly to
preserve privacy and remove potentially identifying details,
“So the wind energy areas were developed…with BOEM and the
Commonwealth and the fishing working group said we fish here and the
habitat working group said we’ve got birds here, let’s work with the public
process not permitting but the wind energy siting, the areas the wind energy
areas that are going to be put up for lease, let’s work on configuring those
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right now to make sure the least amount of damage to commercial fishing…
So on the top [referencing
Figure 4.3] that’s where it
started and at the bottom
[referencing Figure 4.4] is
where it ended up. And the
answer to your question is
yes they listen to us in
establishing the wind energy
area.”
Asking if any groups,
individuals, or entities were
worse off in any way because of
the siting process only solidified
these two opposing perspectives.

Figure 4.3: Map:Offshore Wind Projects. Source: BOEM

Those advocating for fishermen said they were worse off, while non-fishermen said
no, with some even expressing that fishermen were being needlessly obstinate and had
been overly catered to already. As one respondent put it,
“…the commercial fishing industry has a lot of input - I mean, they never feel
like it's enough.. candidly. And maybe from an industry perspective it's not
enough to really protect their industry in the way they want to. But in terms
of someone who's not in that community, seeing the amount of impact that
they might be able to have on siting and delaying the process... if I were
going to say any community was overly influential, that one, well…”
The respondent was then asked if they felt that anyone was worse off in any way
after the siting process, to which they responded,
“I don't think so, though commercial fishing, I guess I would say... I'm sure
that they would say that they are.”
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4.2.3 Transmission Concerns
Something that came up on two occasions was the topic of outdated transmission
systems that are outdated and ill equipped for the varied sources of modern-day power.
This was an issue that did not qualify as criticism of offshore wind, or of the Vineyard
Wind project itself, but was closely enough related that it bore mentioning. As one
participant explained,
“…pretty soon we’re gonna have a new problem, and that new problem is
gonna be our current grid was built for a different time, and so as we have
more power coming from wind, the companies are really gonna have to start
to invest in that. So while we’re desperately working at stabilizing, there’s
still a cost over here that’s going to become an issue and that’s
transmission… probably the most annoying thing in the world is when I open
up my gas bill and it says say 80 or 70 dollars for gas and 140 for
transmission costs, it makes people crazy… that’s not going away”
Another participant expressed that they felt like the issue of transmission was
simply not being considered enough during the development process, saying
“one of the things that we think is missing is that state procurements are only
for those generators who own leases in the offshore. So we think that we get
to a larger goal for offshore wind that you really also need to include the
transmission element to an offshore grid to be part of that, so we think there's
a lot of need for legislation along that front to support the industry here.”
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this final section is to use the data collected in section 4.1 and the
discussion of themes in section 4.2 to address the three main goals of the study: 1) To
assess levels of acceptance in MA per the framework both with respect to the Vineyard
Wind project and offshore wind energy in general, 2) To determine if this framework
can be effectively used with respect to the Vineyard Wind development, and 3) To
provide early insights into whether or not this framework can be effectively used with
respect to utility-scale offshore wind developments in general.
Section 5.1 uses the data collected to populate the framework and considers
important themes that arose in each category. Section 5.2 discusses the sliding scale of
support that was encountered. Section 5.3 makes final determinations with respect to
the goals of this study, and finally section 5.4 gives recommendations for further
research.

5.1: APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK
Table 5.1 shows this researcher’s efforts to fill in the 2012 framework. This chart
was based on the summation chart created by Sovacool and Ratan shown in Table 5.2.
Rather than assess multiple case studies, Table 5.1 measures only the Vineyard Wind
case study, but also adds in indicators, much like those in Table 5.2, and then ranks
them as either weak, medium, or strong.
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Table 5.1: An assessment of Vineyard Wind project using Sovacool and Ratan’s 2012 framework

Table 5.2: The degree of social and market acceptance for renewable electricity in Germany, United
States, Denmark, and India. Source: Sovacool and Ratan, 2012
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5.1.1 Socio-Political
The socio-political section of Sovacool and Ratan’s framework heavily relied on
institutions, legislative, and political structures, with the implication that these are all
National. The nature of the Vineyard Wind project (not to mention all other large-scale
offshore wind projects currently being planned for the United States) is that aside from
being located in federal waters, the particulars of the project - including but not limited
to political support, policies, and contracts with utilities - mostly depend on the State.
If one was to define “institution” as “national” as sovacool and ratan tend to do, then
all three of the socio-political criteria would remain virtually unmet. All of the
indicators within this section that are designated as “strong” fall under state or other.
To compare, only one out of three of the federal level indicators is labeled as
“medium”, while the other two are labeled as “weak”.
This dual existence of State and Federal governments in the United States was
implicitly taken into account in Sovacool and Ratan’s original creation of the
framework - after all, United States solar photovoltaics was one of their four case
studies. In their conclusions, the researches made statements such as, “Net metering in
most states in the U.S. allow solar and small-scale wind producers to sell electricity
back to the grid at real-time prices, making peak production more valuable” (Sovacool
and Ratan, 2012). Statements like this acknowledged the dichotomy, but arguably did
not adequately expand on it. This is not to say that the framework cannot be used to
assess clean energy developments in the United Sates, but it will be a complication
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that needs to be acknowledged and discussed in analyses, especially given the size and
scale of offshore wind farms.
Since publishing this piece in 2012, researcher Sovacool co-authored an article
titled: “A conceptual framework for understanding the social acceptance of energy
infrastructure: Insights from energy storage”, which was published in 2017. This piece
acknowledges this shortcoming, stating that,
“Whilst the [2012] framework is useful for distinguishing contrasting aspects
of acceptance, each involving different actors, it is weakened by a lack of
emphasis upon how each dimension inter-relates across different
geographical scales (from macro to micro; international, national and local).”
(Devine-Wright et al., 2017)
This 2017 piece goes on to argue that a comprehensive and holistic examination of
overlapping governance structures and “middle actors” would lead to a more inclusive
assessment of socio-political support.

5.1.2 Market
A complication encountered in this section was that the distinctions between the
three subsections of Market became blurry when talking about a project of this
magnitude. This 800-megawatt wind farm is a large, grid scale development that will
supply power directly into the grid. Furthermore, it is still in the planning and
permitting stage so it is too early to see which groups of stakeholders will engage with
it and how. The criteria were originally tested on smaller scale terrestrial renewable
energy technology installations. Some examples of indicators that Sovacool and Ratan
used to fulfill the market criteria from their four case studies can be seen in table 5.3.
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Given the fact that this was
far from a residential scale
project, policy mechanisms like
net metering in the US and feedin tariff systems in Germany for
example simply do not apply.
Furthermore, since most of the
supply chain and manufacturing is
foreign rather than domestic at
this point, incentives designed to
encourage local production were
not particularly applicable either.
This resulted in a limited amount
of data that could be used to
populate the Market criteria, and
it was difficult to separate this
Table 5.3: Examples of indicators how criteria were
satisfied by Sovacool and Ratan’s case studies.
Source: Sovacool and Ratan, 2012

data into three distinct subsections
given its somewhat ambiguous

applicability. This of course informs the core question of this study, that being whether
or not this framework can be effectively used to assess social acceptance of the
Vineyard Wind project. The fourth and the sixth criterion can still be used as they are
written now, albeit in somewhat reinterpreted or creative ways (given the juxtaposition
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of a project in federal jurisdiction that is contracting with an individual state, as well as
the virtually nonexistent domestic supply chain, at least for the time being).
With respect to criterion five, it is the opinion of this researcher that the criterion
was poorly thought out and is flawed as it currently exists. It is defined as “Investors
and users/producers have access to reliable information about renewable energy
policies, prices, and opportunities”.
As shown in Table 5.3, feedback is defined in two ways in Sovacool and Ratan’s
study; both as feeding back into the grid, like net metering, and as providing
qualitative feedback as part of a system of checks and balances. Not only is this not
clear in the wording of either the criterion or its definition, these are two very different
meanings of the word “feedback” and they should not be used to inform the same
criterion.
With respect to this study, the scale of the project (that being the fact that it is a
utility-scale development in federal waters as opposed to one that is community or
individually owned) is what truly shined a light on the aforementioned flaws. The only
context in which this could apply to consumers would be when they are also the
producers. Net metering from rooftop solar, for example, is a benefit that an individual
can reap because in that context, they are both the producer and the user.
This point might be countered with the argument that there is not a problem with
the criterion, but rather if a development is beyond the scale of individual ownership
then it simply wouldn’t be able to qualify as “met”. This logic, however, would also be
flawed. Sovacool and Ratan argue that all four of their case studies met this criterion
!56

including both commercial wind in Denmark and India, and yet in both cases, the
evidence they used to justify that this criterion had been met were based off their
second interpretation of the word “feedback”. They cited that mechanisms were in
place in both countries that allowed for communication between users and producers
that facilitated checks and balances. While this is valuable information, it is not at all
in the same category of financial incentives from feeding energy back into the grid.
Overall, this seems like an underdeveloped criterion idea that should be revisited,
especially because it considers some important factors, but hasn’t cohesively tied them
together.

5.1.3 Community
Defining community is a difficult task when it comes to renewable energy
(Walker, Devine-Wright, 2008), which only becomes increasingly more difficult when
considering areas out at sea. There is no adjacent town, for example, and one must
reconsider the definition of “community” and look at the area from a different
perspective.
It was necessary to reimagine the common definition of community for this
section. The way it was considered in this study was through users and stakeholders
such as fishermen, tribes, environmentalists, and sailors in lieu of a neighborhood, for
example. This reimagining of the definition of “community” allowed the criteria to
translate reasonably well from land based to sea based, but there were exceptions. For
example, criterion number seven, Prolific Community / Individual Ownership and Use
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barely applied, and was in fact the only one of the criteria that was flat out not met.
This wasn’t an issue of whether or not the criterion could be accounted for, but rather
if the project could even be measured using this criterion at all. In other words, would
it be possible for an offshore wind project to ever meet this?
The answer to that question remains to be seen. Community ownership of utility
scale offshore wind farms seems a hard concept to envision, but it is not impossible. In
2001 the Middlegrunden Offshore Wind Farm was built off the coast of Copenhagen in
Denmark and is owned half by its developers Københavns Energi and half by
Middelgrundens Vindmøllelaug, a private cooperative partnership (Renewable
Technology | Middlegrunden). At the time that it opened it was the largest offshore
wind farm in the world, and yet a community cooperative held just as much of as stake
as the developers did. Today however a twenty-turbine development with a fortymegawatt capacity is considered relatively small.
The idea of “community ownership” is not simple to define. As previously
addressed, the word “community” itself is often contested when considering
renewable energy, and therefore it makes sense that adding the aspect of “ownership”
would only further complicate things. In 2008, researchers Walker and Devine-Wright
published an article explaining the flexibility of the definition, and the fact that there is
a wide range when considering levels of stakeholder participation and distribution of
benefits. That said, they do give examples of what each end of the spectrum looks like,
stating that a conventionally developed wind farm would represent:
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“a project that has minimal direct involvement of local people and is
developed by a distant and closed institution, that generates energy for the
grid rather than for use in the locality and that produces economic returns for
distant shareholders rather than local people.” (498)
This would be on the opposite side of the spectrum from,
“an ‘ideal’ community project, one which is entirely driven and carried
through by a group of local people and which brings collective benefits to the
local community (however that might be defined)—a project that is both by
and for local people.”
(498)
While it may be a reach to imagine a utility-scale offshore wind farm ever being
able to measure up entirely to the second example, there certainly exists the possibility
that one could land somewhere along the spectrum. Middlegrunden is an example of
this. While it is much more community-oriented than most offshore wind farms, it was
not universally desired, and there existed a group of yachtsmen, fishermen, individuals
and politicians who were opposed to the project (Haggett, 2011). The Vineyard Wind
farm, however, matches Walker and Devine-Wright’s definition of a conventionallydeveloped wind farm virtually word for word, and cannot be considered “community
owned” by and stretch of the definition.
This should in no way be seen as a criticism of the framework or it’s criteria. The
fact that community is hard to define with respect to offshore wind energy does not
mean that the idea of community ownership should be viewed as not applicable when
considering offshore wind farms. Rather it could be argued that it is imperative that the
criterion be considered, as it helps highlight this issue.
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5.2 THE SLIDING SCALE OF SUPPORT
Something that jumped out almost immediately while analyzing the data obtained
during the interview process was the fact that the nine criteria would not be able to be
simply checked off or not. The framework initially appeared to be a straightforward
checklist with criterion which either could or could not be accounted for. Upon further
inspection however, determining if a criterion had been met proved to be more about
deciding if there were enough indicators that could show proof of support and then
determining if these identified indicators were sufficiently strong or substantive
enough.
The “strength” column in Table 5.1 attempted to address this. Some indicators or
evidence of support brought forth during interviews were clearly stretching the
definition, like the representation-by-proxy argument offered up in criterion seven.
Others were seen by some to have not mattered at all, like in the case of how
commercial fishermen felt that their opportunities for participation in the siting process
were simply a formality; that the developers were simply checking a box. Many
participants also expressed frustration over the accessibility of information, stating that
while technically the process was “transparent”, it was impossible to follow along with
the meetings, hearings, and comment periods, and that staying informed meant wading
through legal jargon and technical documents they were unable to understand.
The only criterion that was categorically determined to be unmet was number
seven, Prolific Community / Individual Ownership and Use. Every other criterion
technically had enough evidence of support present to the point that they were all,
!60

arguably, able to be met. That said, the strength of the indicators varied widely and
were highly up for debate. Especially in criteria eight, Participatory Project Siting,
there were staunch disagreements about how much public opinion was genuinely taken
into account versus whether it was just for show. The fact that a criterion is technically
satisfied does not necessarily mean that the situation is resolved. A quick look at a
chart that shows eight out of nine criteria as being met with respect to the Vineyard
Wind project could very likely lead someone to the incorrect assumption that the
project is generally supported with little contention.
This failure to prominently acknowledge a sliding scale of support is a major
oversight by Sovacool and Ratan, one which has the potential to influence or distort
results of studies that use their framework as a foundation. The researchers came close
to discussing the idea when they stated in their 2012 study that acceptance is treated as
something relative and different from diffusion, and that accounting for each aspect of
the framework does not facilitate absolute acceptance but rather an accelerated rate of
diffusion (Sovacool and Ratan, 2012). In other words, they concede that the criteria in
not infallible, but rather a useful measuring tool which helps gauge how well a project
might integrate into a community. What they do not account for, however, is the
spectrum of opinion about the true strength of the indicators they used to populate
their framework. This is a shortcoming which arguably needs to be looked into further.
Despite the fact that the framework was revisited in the 2017 and some aspects were
rethought, any contemplation around evaluating the strength of particular indicators of
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support, or acknowledging variances in stakeholder opinions was once again not
considered.
It is important to recognize the nuances of why wind farms might be met with
resistance. An article published in 2009 outlines five common assumptions about how
the public perceives wind power. They are as follow:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The majority of the public supports wind power.
Opposition to wind power is therefore deviant.
Opponents are ignorant or misinformed.
The reason for understanding opposition is to overcome it.
Trust is key.
(Aitken, 2010)

The article goes on to explain how any discourse regarding wind farms (on- or
offshore) that rests on these assumptions will be misguided and will hinder a fuller
understanding of community acceptance. Not only do these viewpoints suppress
critical thinking and informed discussion, the author argues, but allowing them to
shape the narrative gives a disproportionate amount of credibility to whoever holds
them, while unfairly discounting any dissension. This has the effect of imagining one
side as right and the other wrong, and this determination of rightness creates the
illusion that one person is the expert, while the other is simply mistaken.
The sort of thinking introduced in the Aiken piece leads into the argument that the
idea of NIMBYism carries connotations of selfishness which in turn invalidates any
objections one might have (Wolsink, 2000, Lake, 1993), while in reality objections can
be extremely valid, not to mention nuanced, complex, and multi-layered.
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A more accurate way of looking at the individuals who expressed degrees of
antipathy is by considering what type of resistance was being encountered. In an
article titled: “Wind Power and the NIMBY-Myth: Institutional Capacity and the
Limited Significance of Public Support” (Wolsink, 2000), the reader is introduced to
four different types of resistance. Each of the four is distinctly different, and yet all
(unfortunately) often get lumped into the NIMBY category - a label which, as
previously stated, carries with it a negative stigma. The last type is defined as,
“Resistance created by the fact that particular projects are considered faulty,
without a rejection of the technology as a whole. This type advocates the
generation of wind power, but only under some conditions. This opposition is
particularly limited to proposed wind farms on specific locations, as it is
based on concerns about the consequences of a wind power plant, on
primarily the scenery and, to a lesser degree, on interference and nuisance.
People here may be unconvinced about the suitability of the selected site.
They may expect interference or they may consider the landscape on the
chosen location too sensitive, especially when other available locations
nearby are considered more suitable.” (Wolsink, 2000)
This explanation fits the type of concerns expressed by some of the more
skeptical participants in this study. While there are some individuals who staunchly
object to offshore wind no matter what, it is far more common to hear concerns that
were grounded, genuine, and specific to the area in question but did not categorically
dismiss offshore wind as a whole.

5.3 DETERMINATIONS
The goals of this study were: 1) To assess levels of acceptance in MA per the
framework both with respect to the Vineyard Wind project and offshore wind energy in
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general, 2) To determine if this framework can be effectively used with respect to the
Vineyard Wind development, and 3) To provide early insights into whether or not this
framework can be effectively used with respect to utility-scale offshore wind
developments in general.

5.3.1 An Assessment of Massachusetts
Using the framework as a guide, it is the opinion of this researcher that
Massachusetts as a state is, on the whole, receptive to the idea of the Vineyard Wind
project and to offshore wind energy. The data collected through interviews and
supplementary research into Massachusetts policies, programs, and incentives shows
that at a socio-political level there is strong legislation and supportive politicians, while
at the market level there is a robust renewable energy sector, and systems in place that
facilitate relative ease of entry for developers. Finally at the community level, the data
shows that there is overall positive sentiment towards renewable energy production
among key informants, as well as (for the most part) a desire to see the project created.
Considering this, one might assume that the project was moving along, and yet that is
not the case.
Despite this overall state-level enthusiasm, major barriers to the development of
Vineyard Wind still exist. This past summer the federal government unexpectedly
delayed the project, calling for a comprehensive “cumulative impacts
statement” (Vineyard Wind | BOEM). This delay came as a shock not only to
developers but to all those who were following the progress, but perhaps it should not
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have. The ultimate go-ahead for development of the project lies with the federal
government who, as previously stated, is relatively ambivalent towards offshore wind
development. The current administration maintains that their decision to delay the
project is not politically motivated, and that they are simply trying to exercise caution,
an attitude that was echoed by BOEM Acting Director Walter Cruickshank when he
stated that,
“In our draft EIS [environmental impact statement], we looked relatively
narrowly at existing plots that we had in place and existing PPAs for what
was reasonably foreseeable. Since that draft EIS was published [in late
2018], it seemed almost weekly there were new announcements from states
about their new goals and new RFPs.”
(Stromsta, 2019).
This inconsistency between state and federal priorities interests is, as previously
stated, not adequately reflected in the criteria, and the framework would not be able to
predict this. This poses the questions; how adequate are the criteria for measuring the
Vineyard Wind project and offshore wind energy in general?

5.3.2 An Assessment of the Framework
First and foremost it must be stated that this framework is an excellent tool overall
for measuring acceptance of renewable energy developments. Each criterion demands
that a researcher look at a project from a unique perspective and allows for a
comprehensive understanding of the specific case they are studying. By addressing the
following three aspects, it is the opinion of this researcher than the framework could be

!65

effectively used to assess social acceptance of the Vineyard Wind project specifically,
but also offshore wind energy developments in general.
Firstly, the framework does not adequately allow for nuance or a spectrum of
opinion. Therefore, it is the opinion of this researcher that there should be another
criterion added to the framework. The purpose of this would be to contextualize
opposition opinion. The criteria are looking to see if something is present, but this
criterion would be concerned with making sure opposition was not present. The title
could be along the lines of: An Absence of Opposition Groups, with a description like
“There are no organizations or groups who express resistance to the project, particularly
the chosen location, for reasons including but not limited to concerns over the natural
environment, the historical significance, or accessibility to the area.” This would
incorporate the previous ideas about types of resistance, and would allow for a more
accurate and realistic look at the nuances and complexities of the situation and would
have been able to capture a lot of the contention during Cape Wind and the current
controversy over commercial fishing interests
Secondly, criterion five as it currently exists is problematic and needs to be
restructured. “Mechanisms for Information and Feedback” needs to be more clearly
thought through, and the scope of what the researchers are looking for needs to be
redefined.
Third and finally, the definition of “institution” needs to be revisited. The sociopolitical section of Sovacool and Ratan’s framework heavily relied on institutions,
legislative, and political structures, without adequately acknowledging dual existence of
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State and Federal governments in some countries including the United States. The
nature of the Vineyard Wind project (not to mention all other large-scale offshore wind
projects currently being planned for the United States) is that aside from being located
in Federal waters, the particulars of the project - including but not limited to political
support, policies, and contracts with utilities - mostly dependent on the state. This
dichotomy was taken into account in Sovacool and Ratan’s original creation of the
framework - after all, United States solar photovoltaics was one of their four case
studies, but it was not adequately expanded on. This issue has been addressed since, as
was previously stated, when researcher Sovacool was a contributing author on the 2017
article published by Devine-Wright et al. Inclusion of “middle actors” as discussed
would allow for a wider definition of the word “institution” which could include state
and local governments.

5.4: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
Suggestions for further research based on this study are:
1. Conduct a similar study once this (or a handful) of offshore wind developments
are up and running along the east coast to see how results would change based
on: a) The physical presence, b) Actual versus theorized effects and operations,
and c) Geography (if studies were being conducted in multiple locations).
2. Engage in an in-depth examination into whether or not this framework can be
effectively used to measure large scale offshore wind farms in general.

!67

APPENDICES
Appendix A: Recruitment Scripts

1. EMAIL RECRUITMENT
Dear [insert name],
My name is Jamie Buck and I am a graduate student from the department of
Marine Affairs at the University of Rhode Island (URI). I am writing to invite you to
participate in a URI research study, the purpose of which is to gain insight into public
acceptance of offshore wind energy development in Massachusetts. You are eligible to
participate in this study because through your involvement with [insert their
professional, recreational and/or social affiliation], you represent a member of the
public who is particularly connected with and informed on the establishment of
offshore wind energy in Massachusetts. I obtained your contact information from
[describe source].
If you decide to take part in this study, you will participate in an interview lasting
no more than 45 minutes in a location of your choosing, during which we will discuss
offshore wind energy from socio-political, market, and community perspectives. Your
personal information will be kept confidential, and you reserve the right to terminate
involvement at anytime. You will not receive any benefits as a result of this study. You
must be 18 years or older to participate in this study. With your permission I would
like to audio record your interview in order to transcribe our discussion and
subsequently develop accurate conclusions.
Remember, this is completely voluntary. If you would like to participate or have
any questions about the study, please email or contact me at jamieb214@my.uri.edu or
by phone at 617-921-0327. This research has been approved by The University of
Rhode Island Institutional Review Board
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Thank you very much.
Sincerely,
Jamie Buck, Graduate Student Researcher, and
Dr. David Bidwell, Principal Investigator

2. PHONE RECRUITMENT
Hello, my name is Jamie Buck. I’m calling from the University of Rhode Island
about a research study. Am I speaking to ____________ (name of recruit)?
If “no,” wait for recruit to pick up, arrange to leave a message, or ask for a time to
call back. If “yes”:
I got your phone number from ________ (describe contact source). Is this a good
time to talk? I expect this phone call will take about ten minutes.
Arrange to call at another time, if appropriate.
I’m calling to see if you would be interested in participating in a research study
being conducted by the University of Rhode Island, the purpose of which is to gain
insight into public acceptance of offshore wind energy development in Massachusetts.
I am reaching out to you today because through your involvement, be it professional,
recreational and/or social, you represent a member of the public who is particularly
connected with and informed on the establishment of offshore wind energy in
Massachusetts.
So long as you are 18 years of age or older you are eligible to participate. If you
decide to be involved, you would take part in a semi-structured interview lasting up to
45 minutes in a location of your choosing. Does this sound like something you would
be interested in participating in?
Leave time for response. If “no”, thank them for their time. If “yes”, continue:
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That’s great, so before we go on, let me tell you a little bit about your rights as a
research subject. The main risk of participating in an interview is loss of
confidentiality. However, we will do our best to keep your information confidential.
With your consent I would like to audio record the interview, however this is not a
requirement for participation. We keep all transcriptions and audio recordings (if there
are any) on a password protected computer and/or external hard drive, and will destroy
them after three years. Informed consent forms will be kept in a locked filing cabinet
in the Marine Affairs office at the University of Rhode Island.
So finally the last step will be coordinating a time and place to meet that works
for you.
Leave time for response - schedule a time and place or allow for them to email with
options.
If you have questions about the study, you can call reach me at 617-921-0327, or
by email at jamieb214@my.uri.edu. If you have questions about your rights as a
research subject or research-related injuries, you can call the URI Research Integrity
Office at (401) 874-4328.
Thank you so much for your time, and I look forward to meeting you. Have a
great day.1

1

Modified script from Oregon Health and Science University. Original script: http://www.ohsu.edu/xd/research/
about/integrity/irb/upload/Telephone-Recruitment-and-Screening-Script-FINAL-1-24-2014.docx
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Appendix B: Interview Protocol

This script acts as a guide rather than a hard and fast set of questions which must be
asked. The goal of the interview is to allow for new ideas to be brought up and for
conversations to evolve and expand naturally.
1. Socio Political
i. Strong institutional capacity
1. Which if any organizations involved in offshore wind energy
development are you familiar with?
2. Are you in any way affiliated with any of these organizations?
3. Do you feel that the idea of offshore wind energy development has
support from these entities?
ii. Political commitment
1. Are you familiar with the viewpoints of any politicians (local, state,
and/or federal) with regard to offshore wind energy development? If
so, please expand.
iii.Favorable legal and regulatory frameworks
1. Are you familiar with any legislation surrounding offshore wind
energy development (local, state, federal)?
2. Do you feel that it truly supports offshore wind energy
development?
3. Do you feel that offshore wind energy development is too strongly
supported? Not strongly enough?
2. Market:
i. Competitive installation/production costs
1. Do you feel that wind energy will be financially risky in any way?
2. Do you feel that the implementation of offshore wind energy
structures has enough support? Too much support?
ii. Mechanisms for information and feedback
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1. Do you have any thoughts on the transparency of the process?
2. Do you feel that there is an adequate framework in place to inform
the public on policy mechanisms?
iii.Access to financing
1. Are you familiar with any aspects of the supply chain?
2. Do you feel that the costs of offshore wind energy development are
reasonable?
3. Do you feel like there is healthy market competition?
4. Do you think offshore wind will be affordable to Massachusetts
consumers?
5. Do you feel satisfied with the local, state, and/or federal role in the
installation/production?
3. Community:
i. Prolific community/individual ownership and use
1. Do you feel that the citizens of Massachusetts will have an adequate
stake in the control and/or management of the wind farm?
ii. Participatory project siting
1. Are you familiar with the process of how this project was sited?
2. Do you feel that there was adequate room for citizen input?
3. Do you feel that the input received was taken into account to an
acceptable degree?
4. Do you feel that any groups/individuals/entities were
underrepresented or overrepresented in the siting process?
5. Do you feel that any groups/individuals/entities are worse off in any
way because of the siting process?
iii.Recognition of externalities or positive public image
1. Do you feel that there is a positive sentiment toward renewable
energy among the citizens of Massachusetts?
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Appendix C: Consent Form
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Appendix D: NVivo Codebook
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